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# Corona Disaster and Politics

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**ABSTRACT:** The COVID-19 pandemic presents an occasion to refocus scholarly attention on the politics of catastrophe. Crises that unexpectedly upend political and economic relations are imperative and increasing in incidence. However, the division of international relations into international political economy (IPE) and international security has contributed to the relative disregard of non-militarized crises like pandemics. Crises are defined by menace, uncertainty, and time pressure: understanding them requires a vigilant examination of how these variables affect political and economic outcomes. Drawing on often incongruent literatures on finance, vigor and climate change, natural disasters, pandemics, and violent clash, it is necessary to propose a broad research program around the politics of crisis, focusing on puzzles related to causes, responses, and transformations.

**KEYWORDS:** corona, pandemic, politics, crisis, COVID-19

## I. INTRODUCTION

The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) triggered a global pandemic and monetary tightening unlike anything seen for roughly a century. COVID-19 is less fatal than many other recent diseases, such as Ebola, Avian Influenza, and Tuberculosis. However, the virus that causes COVID-19—severe sharp respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)—appears to be calibrated to impose maximum harm on the modern-day world economy. The virus extends rapidly by taking benefit of globalization and interconnectedness.[1] Unlike virus conduction in the 2003 SARS epidemic, COVID-infected persons unknowingly became super-spreaders as their symptoms developed slowly and often remained meek. Epidemiologists suggested pulling down the epidemic curve by effectively shutting down large segments of the market, and many governments gratified.[2]



It is alluring to leave research on COVID-19 to scientific experts such as epidemiologists, immunologists, and virologists. Political scientists cannot eliminate the virus or cure the disease. However, the impact of COVID-19 is ultimately dogged by politics.[20] As Thomas Hale observes, “COVID-19 attacks the human body, but it is largely the body expedient that defends us against it.” Why are some countries more exposed to major crises such as global



pandemics. Why do some governments take action more quickly and aggressively. How do familial and international institutions convert in response to major shocks. On these matters, political scientists are the related experts.[3]

## II. OBSERVATIONS

The first, basic conundrum of crises is why governments permit them to happen. For political leaders, crises come with important costs and few benefits. Retrospective reports usually reveal that governments failed to provide cost-effective preventative measures that could have forestalled or mitigated a crisis.[19] International security scholars have developed a large text around the inefficiency of war puzzle, which asks why leaders connect in war when diplomacy could achieve the same result without the cost of fighting. It is useful to analogously begin with a “crisis inadequacy” puzzle: why do governments face costly crises rather than adopting adequate anticipatory measures.[4]




**Corona help**

Preparation for a crisis occurs under ordinary conditions without discriminating threat or time pressure. [18] This means some of the customary assumptions of open economy politics are largely credible for explaining variation in prevention: distributive conflict can be an important hurdle, and decision-making tends to occur through established institutional mechanisms. However, one of the core characteristics of crises—improbability—is particularly heightened before a crisis occurs. The paucity of crises contributes to pervasive uncertainty ex ante: not only are the characteristics and consequences of future crises unfamiliar, but it is also difficult to ascertain their chances and relative frequency. Heightened uncertainty can decrease the likelihood of victorious preventative policies.[5]

## III. DISCUSSION

The lack of direct attention to crisis avoidance from policymakers and voters means vulnerability is often influenced by spread out effects from institutional choices and policy outcomes in other domains.[17] For example, financial crises are more likely in countries with well-developed securities markets, which makes banks more prone to risk-taking with foreign capital. Policies that supported small, decentralized banks in the United States led to less diversification and more frequent crises than in Canada, which developed a nationwide branch banking system. For COVID-19, a believable source of such spillover is variation in the strength of civil society. [6]



**Corona pandemic in India**

COVID-19 prevention at the individual level has features of a classic cooperative action problem: precautionary measures involve personal costs, but the benefits are diffuse for many in the public.[16] For young, healthy people with no medical risk factors, actions like wearing a mask, closing their industry, or following social distancing rules are in my opinion costly to varying degrees, but the direct personal profit is small.[15] This is in particular true if the rest of society diligently follows precautionary actions and limits contagion. An important potential source of non-policy distinction is then whether societies can achieve cooperative behavior without coercive government intervention. This is in turn influenced by the strength of civil society and social assets, which are also important factors in the flexibility of local communities to natural disasters.[7]




Corona management authority logos

**IV. RESULTS**

Existing work in unwrapped economy politics tends to focus on distributive conflict and short time horizons as a hindrance to crisis resolution.[14] Macroeconomic adjustments can be delayed by distributive concerns and repugnance toward costs that need to be imposed on specific actors. Concentrated interest groups may perch in favor of policy



measures that prolong declaration and impose greater costs on society. The use of regulatory moderation in banking crises is a good example. Both bank and government leaders may prefer to suspend accounting rules in order to postpone a computation, even if forbearance magnifies the burden of bad debt for their successors and the public.[13] Hence, an important foundation of variation in crisis response is how institutions aggregate the interests of ordered interest groups and voters. For example, democratic institutions authorize voters and reduce the use of public resources to bail out banks.[8]



**Impact of corona**

Distributive conflict and institutional biases are useful for explaining some important aspects of crisis response. However, it is also serious to consider the core features of crises—uncertainty, time stress and threat—along with how these factors put on a pedestal the role of leaders and ad hoc decision-making compared to common times.[9]

**V. CONCLUSION**

COVID-19 directly and significantly impacted the daily lives of all of us. It is critical for scholars to develop theories and experimental approaches to better understand the politics of the pandemic. To do so, we need to refocus our attention on the politics of crisis as a core research schema, combining the strengths of IPE and security studies.[12] Standard assumptions in IPE need to be revised or supplemented by considering the hub features of crises—threat, uncertainty, and urgency—and how they vary across and within crisis episodes. The research program can be controlled around puzzles surrounding causes, response, and transformation. [10]



### Covid vaccination

The COVID-19 pandemic creates a window for transformative strategy change with potentially long-lasting penalty: by discussing several potential avenues for such change that are worthy of attention. Furthermore, political science as a discipline also faces a transformational opportunity in luminosity of the pandemic. It is an opportunity well worth seizing.[11]

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